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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
• First, we describe the legal and actual proce-
dure of the Monetary Dialogue and also the
relationship between the European Central
Bank (ECB) and the European Parliament more
generally. We judge the Monetary Dialogue pro-
cedure in a positive light overall: the fixed
schedule of quarterly meetings allows the ECB
and the Parliament to have a general discus-
sion on economic policy. The ECB complies with
all its obligations under the Treaties and
appears to cooperate fully with the Parliament
during the Dialogue. 
• Second, we compare the practices of the ECB
with the procedures of the Bank of England and
the Federal Reserve (Fed). The structure of the
Monetary Dialogue is quite similar to its equiv-
alents in the United Kingdom and the United
States in terms of hearings and reports. How-
ever, because of some key differences, the ECB
is less accountable or transparent than the
Bank of England or the Fed: the European Par-
liament cannot sanction the ECB if it fails to
fulfil its mandate, the European Parliament’s
has only a consultative role in the appointment
of ECB executive board members, and the ECB
does not publish the minutes and the votes of
the Governing Council meetings.
• Third, we assess the dialogue in the last five
years. The introductory statements made by
the ECB president appear to never reveal impor-
tant news or new policy measures, which tends
to make the event less interesting for the media
and the general public. However, the president
is invited to give a view on some topics decided
in advance by the European Parliament eco-
nomic and monetary affairs committee (ECON).
External monetary experts also write briefings
on those topics in preparation for the hearing.
We think that it could lead to a very fruitful dis-
cussion if members of the Parliament would
focus on those topics, but this does not often
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happen. We also think that MEPs should put
some emphasis on the successes or failures of
the ECB in fulfilling its mandate: they should
formally review its performance relative to its
primary objective, and its secondary objective
of supporting the goals of the European Union.
To do that more effectively we recommend that
the ECON committee chairman plays a greater
role and asks the same series of very specific
questions about the ECB’s fulfilment of its man-
dates to the president of the ECB at the begin-
ning of each hearing’s Q&A session.
• Fourth, we assess the visibility of the Monetary
Dialogue in the media. It appears that Monetary
Dialogues are much less reported in the press
than ECB monthly press conferences. Given
that the accountability of the ECB to the Euro-
pean Parliament is only based on the informa-
tion exchange with the ECB and not on the
enforcement of its mandate, reporting of the
event in the media should be important for the
European Parliament. A publicised and well-
functioning live stream, and a quickly available
transcript of the hearing would enhance the
transparency of this exercise and increase its
visibility.
• Fifth, we consider what role the Dialogue could
play in the current context of the evolving role
of the ECB. We discuss in particular forward
guidance and quantitative easing (QE). We
review the main features and how those poli-
cies have been implemented by other central
banks, and we suggest the appropriate role for
the Monetary Dialogue in relation to each of
those policies. On forward guidance, we believe
that a discussion about the future course of
monetary policy before the European Parlia-
ment, and the inevitable political discussions
that come with the testimony both within Par-
liament and in the press as part of the Mone-
tary Dialogue, might contribute to more
effective forward guidance. Such discussions
should therefore be encouraged for reasons of
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What accountability means in this context is not
really spelled out, but according to Schedler
(1999) accountability should be two-dimensional.
Accountable central banks should be obliged to
inform representatives of the people about their
policy decisions and they should be able to jus-
tify them. Parliaments (or governments depend-
ing on the case) should be able to impose
sanctions on central banks in case they fail to fulfil
their mandates. 
However, the ECB’s situation is peculiar compared
to other independent central banks. It is one of the
most independent central banks in the world: it
has full operational independence, financial inde-
pendence and it even has target independence.
The treaty establishes price stability as the EB’s
primary objective, but it does not give a precise
definition of what is meant by price stability. The
ECB Governing Council has therefore announced
it intends to maintain inflation rates below, but
close to, two percent over the medium term. Given
this degree of independence, one should expect
a high level of accountability. But the ECB only sat-
isfies one part of Schedler’s definition of account-
ability. It is true that the ECB explains regularly its
actions to the European Parliament, but there is
no way for the Parliament to take action if the ECB
fails to fulfil its mandate. This is different to the sit-
uation facing the Fed, for example. A simple major-
ity in Congress plus a presidential signature can
change the Fed’s statutes. The Monetary Dialogue
is therefore essential to provide democratic over-
sight of the ECB. Because it is the only real instru-
ment to make the ECB accountable for its policy, it
should be a key meeting of the ECB and, in our
opinion, it should become more visible, especially
in the current context of the evolving role of the
ECB with the recent introduction of forward guid-
ance, the Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT)
Programme and the Single Supervisory Mecha-
nism (SSM).
In this brief, we first assess the exchange of infor-
mation between the European Parliament and the
ECB (especially during the last five years) and
accountability and transparency and because
the discussions might make the policy more
effective.
• Sixth, if the ECB decides to implement a quan-
titative easing policy, the purchase of govern-
ment bonds in different euro-area countries
would have some distributional consequences.
The Monetary Dialogue would be an ideal plat-
form for the European Parliament to evaluate
any such programme under the ECB’s remit.
• Finally, we conclude with some observations
on the function of the Monetary Dialogue after
the establishment of a banking union in Europe.
Regardless of how effectively the European
Parliament holds the ECB accountable for its
function as banking supervisor, concerns about
whether decisions taken as supervisor affect
monetary policy should be part of the remit of
the Monetary Dialogue.
INTRODUCTION
In the wake of widespread inflation in developed
countries in the 1970s, and subsequent seminal
research by Kydland and Prescott (1977) and
Barro and Gordon (1983), one solution put forward
to prevent political interference in monetary policy
and its effects on inflation was to delegate its
management to individuals who were insulated
from the government and averse to inflation
(Rogoff, 1985). Since then, operational independ-
ence has become an integral part of modern cen-
tral banking.
However, because non-elected officials manage
money and monetary policy, independent central
banks should be accountable to an elected body.
To whom they are accountable is different in dif-
ferent countries: some are accountable directly to
the government, to the parliament or to both.
According to the EU Treaty and the Statute of the
European System of Central Banks (ESCB), in the
euro area, the European Central Bank (ECB) is
accountable to the only directly elected European
Union (EU) institution, the European Parliament.
‘Given the degree of independence given to the European Central Bank, one should expect a high
level of accountability. The ECB explains regularly its actions to the European Parliament, but
there is no way for the Parliament to take action if the ECB fails to fulfil its mandate.’
rates the respective topics into his introductory
statement to the Committee. After his statement,
the ECB President has to answer questions from
committee members. The committee chair leads
the debate, which usually lasts about two hours
including the introductory statement. On the Par-
liament’s request, members of the ECB Executive
Board can be invited to additional meetings. Unlike
the four meetings with ECON, these meetings may
or may not be confidential. After the public meet-
ings, a report is prepared in the official languages
and an audio recording of the meetings should be
available on the European Parliament website.
Additionally, the ECB President shall present once
a year the Annual Report to the European Parlia-
ment plenary, followed by a general debate,
according to Article 284.3 TFEU. Even though it is
not legally regulated, it is common practice that
the ECB Vice-President presents the Annual Report
to ECON on the day of its publication. This usually
takes place around April and leaves the Parliament
some months to draft a resolution that provides
its opinion on the Annual Report, before the Pres-
ident appears before the plenary. In his introduc-
tory statement to plenary, the President
addresses critical points raised in the resolution.
Since 2011, the ECB’s Annual Report has con-
tained a section on external communication and
accountability that describes the ECB’s accounta-
bility to the European Parliament. It takes into
account the dialogue held between the ECB and
the European Parliament and characterises the
main discussion topics. It refers, however, only to
a short selection of topics discussed during the
year. As Figure 1 on the next page shows, the Mon-
etary Dialogue usually includes about eight topics
each year, while the ECB’s Annual Report comes
back to only three of them. We think that the inclu-
sion of this chapter is a positive development for
the dialogue as a whole. A higher degree of com-
pleteness in order to inform the public about the
meetings would be, however, desirable.
In addition to the debate during the meetings, any
MEP can submit questions for written answer to
the ECON Chair, who shall forward them to the ECB,
as stated in Rule 118 of the Rules of Procedure. A
record of written questions and answers shall be
available in the Official Journal of the European
Union. Questions not answered within the dead-
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compare it to other central bank practices around
the world. We propose ways in which the Mone-
tary Dialogue can be improved, and how its role in
the ECB’s communication strategy can be
enhanced. It is important to note that we mainly
restrict the discussion to recommendations to
improve the Monetary Dialogue that could be
easily and immediately implementable and that
do not require a revision of the European Treaties.
Given that a Treaty change would require EU
member state unanimity, the probability of such a
revision on this topic would be very low. Finally,
we consider what role the Monetary Dialogue
could play in the context of an evolving monetary
policy with an emphasis on forward guidance,
quantitative easing (QE) and bank supervision.
1 THE MONETARY DIALOGUE IN PRACTICE
In this section we analyse the relationship
between the European Parliament and the Euro-
pean Central Bank. We describe the legal and
actual procedure of the dialogue, compare the
accountability practices of the ECB to those of the
Bank of England and the Fed and provide an
assessment of the dialogue in the last five years.
1.1 The relationship between the European
Parliament and the ECB
The Legal Basis for the Monetary Dialogue is laid
down in the Treaty on the Functioning of the Euro-
pean Union (TFEU) Article 284.3. The framework is
given in Article 232, which gives the European Par-
liament the right to adopt its own Rules of Proce-
dure. The Rules of Procedure, in turn, give a
framework for the meetings between the Euro-
pean Parliament and the ECB.
Rule 113 regulates ‘Statements by the European
Central bank’. According to 113.3, the ECB Presi-
dent shall appear at least four times a year before
the responsible committee. These meetings are
informally called the Monetary Dialogue and are
held with the Committee of Economic and Mone-
tary Affairs (ECON). Before every meeting, the Par-
liament asks a monetary expert panel to submit
briefing papers on one or two specific topics.
These papers are published on the Parliament
website shortly before the quarterly meetings. It is
common practice that the ECB President incorpo-
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line can be included in the next Monetary Dialogue
meeting at the request of the questioner.
The European Parliament also has a role in the
appointment of ECB Board Members, though this
is not part of the Monetary Dialogue. According to
Rule 109 of the Rules of Procedure and Article
283.2 of the TFEU, any candidate nominated by
the Council as President, Vice-President and Exec-
utive Board Member shall appear before ECON to
make a statement and answer questions. The
Committee in turn makes a recommendation to
the Parliament on the approval of the candidate.
The Parliament has only a consultative role in rela-
tion to the European Council, which approves the
appointment. In case the Parliament does not
agree with the Council’s nomination, its President
can ask the Council to nominate another candi-
date, but the Council can still decide to maintain
the appointment of its nominee. 
Overall, we judge the procedure of the Monetary
Dialogue positively: the fixed schedule and pre-
determined course of events of the quarterly
meetings allows both the ECB and the Parliament
to build expectations about how information is
exchanged between the two bodies. Nevertheless,
we believe that some elements could be improved
and this is what we focus on in section 1.3.
1.2 Practices of other major central banks
In this section, we compare the practices of the
ECB with the procedures of the Bank of England
and the Fed.
Similar to the Monetary Dialogue held between the
European Parliament and the ECB, the Bank of Eng-
land holds a dialogue between the Members of the
Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) and Financial
Policy Committee (FPC) and the House of Com-
mons’ Treasury Select Committee. These hearings
take place on a regular basis. Bank officials also
hold occasional meetings with the House of Lords
Economic Affairs Committee. Unlike the Bank of
England but similarly to the President of the ECB,
there is a fixed schedule of meetings for the Chair-
man of the Fed. He appears, however, only twice a
year before the US Congress: once in front of the
Committee on Banking and Financial Services of
the House of Representatives, and once in front of
the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban
Affairs of the Senate. Additionally, he or other Fed
officials have to appear before either of the Com-
mittees on request. In addition, an Annual Report
prepared by the Fed Board of Governors describing
the Fed’s activities is submitted to the Congress.
While the European Parliament takes at least an
advisory role in the appointment of ECB Executive
Board Members before an appointment is made,
the UK Parliament plays no role in the procedure.
The Crown appoints members of the MPC, after the
prime minister and the Chancellor of the Excheq-
uer have been consulted. Hearings of new MPC
Members by the House of Commons’ Treasury
Select Committee are held only after the appoint-
ment has been made to assess the independence
and the competence of the new appointee. In con-
trast, the US Senate has more power. Any appoint-
ment to the Fed Board of Governors made by the
President of the United States has to be confirmed
by the US Senate before it becomes effective.
In terms of reporting, we note that both the Bank of
England and the Fed are more transparent than
the ECB. Both the Bank of England and the Fed
publish minutes after meetings of the MPC and the
Topics of briefing papers
1 Macroeconomic imbalances and a single monetary policy in
the euro area
2 Non-standard policy measures: a first assessment
3 Role of the ECB in financial assistance programmes
4 Crisis response by central banks
5 Banking union and a single banking supervisory mechanism
6 ECB intervention in the euro area sovereign debt markets
7 Towards a genuine economic and monetary union
8 Monetary policy and banking supervision
ECB Annual Report – Dialogue Focus
The single supervisory mechanism
Outright Monetary Transactions
The long-term vision for EMU
Figure 1: Monetary Dialogue briefing paper topics vs. ECB Annual Report topics in 2012
Source: Bruegel.
1. Duisenberg (2003):
“those who vote and whose
votes could be identified
and recognised would come
under pressure from their
national governments or
parliaments to vote differ-
ently in future, for purely
national reasons and con-
siderations. One of the Gov-
erning Council's greatest
assets is that it has always
taken a euro-area-wide
point of view, and I would
hate to lose that”.
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Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC). The ECB
is the only bank among the three that does not
publish minutes. Since its creation, the ECB has
been afraid that, if votes or discussions were
public, there could be political pressure on mem-
bers of the Governing Council in their countries of
origin – especially if there is a conflict between a
country’s immediate economic interest and that
of the euro area as a whole – and that this would
reduce the independence of Governing Council
members1. However, the ECB could find a solution
to that problem by publishing minutes that would
not reveal individual votes or names in the dis-
cussion. 
Most importantly, the ECB differs from the Fed and
the Bank of England because it cannot be sanc-
tioned by the European Parliament if it fails to fulfil
its mandate. By contrast, in the US for instance, a
simple majority of Congress plus a presidential
signature can amend the Federal Reserve Act and
change the bank’s statutes. There is no such pos-
sibility in the euro area. Table 1 summarises the
main differences in the transparency and
accountability of the three central banks.
1.3 Assessment of the last five years of the
Monetary Dialogue
In this section, we focus mainly on the quarterly
hearing of the ECB President that takes place in
front of the European Parliament Economic and
Monetary Affairs (ECON) committee, and on the
plenary parliamentary sessions to which the pres-
ident is invited. In both cases, the procedure is
similar: the ECB president reads a statement and
Table 1: Comparison of the ECB, the Bank of England and the Fed
European Central Bank Bank of England Fed Reserve Board
Legal basis TEU, TFEU, Statute of the ESCB;
international law, can only be
changed with unanimity of EU
countries
1998 Bank of England Act Federal Reserve Act, can be
altered by Congress
Appointment of Board
Members
President, the vice president and
the other members of the
Executive Board shall be
appointed by the European
Council, on a recommendation
from the Council after it has con-
sulted the European Parliament
and the Governing Council.
The Court is appointed by the
Crown on the advice of the prime
minister and the chancellor of
the exchequer. Treasury commit-
tee holds appointment hearings
for new Monetary Policy Commit-
tee (MPC) and Financial Policy
Committee (FPC) members.
US president appoints members
of the Board of Governors.
Appointment has to be con-
firmed by the US senate. 
Accountability to European Parliament House of Commons’ Treasury
Select Committee and government
US Congress
Testimony frequency ECB president appears four
times a year before the ECON
committee. At Parliament's
request, the president, vice
president and other members of
the Executive Board shall be
invited to attend additional
meetings.
Members of the MPC and FPC
give evidence on a regular basis
at hearings.
Chairman of the Board shall
appear before the Congress in
semi-annual hearings.
Reports President presents Annual
Report to the plenary. Vice presi-
dent presents it to ECON. ECB
replies in writing to written ques-
tions put by MEPs.
MPC members produce an
annual report ahead of Treasury
Committee hearings. After each
meeting of the Monetary Policy
Committee, the Bank publishes
minutes of the meeting.
With each semi-annual hearing,
submit a written report to the
Committee on Banking, Housing,
and Urban Affairs of the Senate
and the Committee on Banking
and Financial Services of the
House of Representatives.
Sanctions On application by the Governing
Council or the Executive Board,
the Court of Justice may com-
pulsorily retire a member of the
Executive Board.
An Member of the Court can be
removed by the Oversight Com-
mittee with the consent of the
Chancellor of the Exchequer.
Board Members can be removed
for cause by the President of the
USA.
Source: Bruegel based on TEU, TFEU, Statutes of the ESCB, European Parliament Rules of Procedure, Protocol No.4 on the Statue of the Euro-
pean System of Central Banks and of the European Central Bank, 1998 Bank of England Act, Federal Reserve Act
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‘The ECB president's introductory statement to the ECON committee is always similar to the
economic and monetary analysis given in the ECB press conference preceding the hearing.
Therefore, no important news or new policy measures are ever revealed during the hearings.’
this is followed by a Q&A session between him
and MEPs.
Concerning the introductory statement by the ECB
president, our careful study of the speeches given
in the last five years reveals that the first part is
always quite similar to the economic and mone-
tary analysis given in the ECB monthly press con-
ference preceding the hearing. Therefore, no
important news or new policy measures are ever
revealed during the hearings. In a way, it makes
sense that the ECB Governing Council makes
announcements of new policies immediately after
decisions are taken, ie during the press confer-
ence following the meeting, and it is also reassur-
ing that its views on the economic situation
expressed in front of the European Parliament are
consistent with those expressed during the previ-
ous months, but this repetition at the hearing also
gives the impression that the ECB considers that
its own press conferences make the hearing
redundant. By contrast, the Fed often uses the
semi-annual testimonies of its chairman to make
important public announcements about its policy.
For instance, current Fed Chair Janet Yellen used
her testimony in front of congress on 11 February
to clarify the Fed’s forward guidance strategy and
announce that it may “be appropriate to maintain
the current target range for the federal funds rate
well past the time that the unemployment rate
declines below 6.5 percent, especially if projected
inflation continues to run below the two percent
goal”.
The second parts of the ECB introductory
speeches are in general much more interesting, in
our view, because they deal with topics on which
the ECB president is invited to give his views.
Topics are chosen by the ECON committee and a
background on the topics is provided by the brief-
ing papers prepared by monetary experts before
each meeting. However, we regret that MEPs do
not focus at all on those topics in their questions
following the ECB president’s statement, as this
would give a focal point to the discussion.
Indeed, the Q&A session following the ECB presi-
dent’s introductory statement is unstructured with
questions covering a wide range of topics, sup-
posedly reflecting the monetary and economic
concerns of European citizens. Of course, it is a
good thing that MEPs are free to ask whatever
question they want to the ECB president. More-
over, it seems that the Monetary Dialogue between
the ECB and the Parliament has matured over time.
The parliamentary discussion has shifted from the
central bank’s ability to maintain price stability
and discomfort with the level of transparency of
its decision making process, to more general dis-
cussions about economic policy.
However, again, we think that the dialogue would
gain from focusing on some particular topics. More
precisely, we have serious doubts about the
extent to which the Monetary Dialogue actually
amounts to an effective assessment of the per-
formance of the ECB. We believe that committee
members should focus on the successes or fail-
ures of the ECB as it works to fulfil its mandate:
they should review its performance towards its pri-
mary objective, and also towards its secondary
objective of supporting the goals of the EU (ie
growth and high employment). Even though the
European Parliament’s instruments to discipline
the ECB are non-existent, a more careful assess-
ment of the ECB’s performance could give more
weight to the monetary dialogue.
One option would be for the ECON committee
chairman to play a more prominent role and ask
the same series of very specific questions at the
beginning of each hearing’s Q&A session about
the ECB’s fulfilment of its mandate. One question,
if observed (or even predicted) inflation is too low
or too high compared to the target, could be: “why
have you missed your inflation target since our
last meeting?”, in the same way that in the UK the
Governor of the Bank of England is required to
send an open letter to the Chancellor every time
inflation moves away from the target by more than
1 percentage point in either direction, to explain
why the Bank of England failed to achieve its man-
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date. In the opposite case, when the inflation
target is met, the Chairman could also ask the ECB
president why the ECB is not doing everything it
can to fulfil its secondary objective and support
EU policy objectives, if the ECON committee con-
siders there are shortcomings in this respect.
Finally, we assess the visibility of the Monetary
Dialogue in the media. Given that the accountabil-
ity of the ECB to the European Parliament is only
based on the information exchange with the ECB
and not on any enforcement powers, reporting of
the event in the media should be important for the
European Parliament. However, as Figure 2 clearly
shows, it seems that the Dialogues are much less
reported in the press than the ECB monthly press
conference. Figure 2 also confirms our idea that
MEPs should focus on one particular topic at each
hearing. The monetary dialogue of October 2012,
during which some MEPs were determined to talk
about gender inequality, seems to have been the
most cited dialogue in the media in the last five
years. We do not say that coverage in the media
should be the objective of this democratic exer-
cise, but that it would help to put the ECB under
democratic scrutiny.
The fact that the dialogue appears to be less
important to the media or ECB watchers than the
ECB monthly press conferences could even give
the wrong impression that the ECB is more
accountable to the financial markets than to the
European Parliament. We also think that other ele-
ments would increase the media visibility and
enhance the transparency of the Monetary Dia-
logue: a publicised and well-functioning live
stream of the event (comparable to that available
for ECB press conferences) is paramount, as are
rapidly available transcripts of the hearings (for
some reason the transcripts of the December
2013 and December 2012 hearings are missing
on the dedicated webpage, and it is impossible to
find the transcripts from before 2009). We encour-
age the European Parliament to highlight this
event, because as long as the event is not suffi-
ciently publicised, the ECB will be reluctant to
make important announcements during the Mon-
etary Dialogue, and reciprocally the event will not
be visible if the ECB does not make important
announcements, so the Monetary Dialogue could
remain stuck in this bad equilibrium.
2 FUTURE ECB POLICY OPTIONS AND THE ROLE
OF THE MONETARY DIALOGUE
This section reviews possible future policy
choices the European Central Bank might face. A
clear challenge for the euro area is deflation. The
price level is below one percent, and a drop below
zero could damage the European economy. More-
over, the ECB’s most prominent conventional mon-
etary tool, namely the interest rate, is already near
zero, which means that the ECB has limited scope
to use this instrument to address low inflation.
Should the European Central Bank looks to what
other banks have done, it will find two types of
policies. The first is forward guidance. The second
is quantitative easing. We review the main fea-
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Source: Bruegel based on Factiva. Note: ‘mentions’ refers to references to the ‘ECB’, ‘EZB’ or ‘BCE’ in English, German and French
language online media on the day of, and the day after, each Monetary Dialogue or press conference in the respective month.
Not every mention is checked for its relevance. The upward bias is, however, the same for both time series.
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‘Discussion of the future course of monetary policy in front of the European Parliament, and the
inevitable political discussions that come with the testimony, represent a move towards greater
contestation and might contribute to more effective forward guidance.’
2. Note that the Federal
Reserve Bank first intro-
duced the concept of ‘for-
ward guidance’ in August
2003, when it feared that
deflation was a risk, and
again in December 2008 at
the height of the global
financial crisis. In these
early cases, there was a cal-
endar date set rather than a
specific macro-economic
target that the Fed expected
to reach before changing
short-term interest rates.
See Plosser (2013).
3. See Federal Reserve
Bank (2014),  and Bank of
England (2013). For both
banks, the statistical over-
shoot would be a rate more
than 0.5 percent above
each bank’s explicit target
of two percent. For the
theoretical justification for
why this policy is especially
effective under very low
interest rates, see Eggert-
son and Woodford (2003).
4. For example Blinder et al
(2008).
tures of each and then suggest the appropriate
role for the Monetary Dialogue in the context of the
two types of policy. We conclude with some obser-
vations on the function of the Monetary Dialogue
after banking union.
2.1 The role of the Monetary Dialogue in the
forward guidance strategy of the ECB
Forward guidance refers to a monetary strategy
meant to guide consumers, markets and politi-
cians about the medium term actions of a central
bank. The version that the Fed and the Bank of
England introduced respectively in December
2012 and August 2013 has two components. The
first indicates that a possible increase in short-
term interest rates will not happen before a spe-
cific macro-economic target is met. This was
initially an unemployment rate of 6.5 percent in
the United States and seven percent in the United
Kingdom2. The goal of the policy is to influence not
just short-term but also long-term interest rates.
If markets are more confident that short-term
interest rates will remain the same, long-term
interest rates will fall towards the short-term rates.
This should then encourage investment in capital
goods as well as in housing. It should be noted
that both institutions made clear that they would
maintain this policy only while it did not mean that
they would significantly overshot their inflation
targets. As the banks note in their explanations, it
is also a policy that they have introduced when
interest rates were already very low and when
there was little scope for further interest rate cuts3.
In February 2014, both banks modified their
frameworks as official unemployment rates fell
close to the pre-announced targets. The Fed
decided to widen its definition of what it counts on
the job market to include other indicators, such as
the long-term unemployed, but it basically kept a
form of unemployment target in place. In the Bank
of England’s case, Governor Mark Carney
announced that the Bank of England would
increase the number of indicators it would use to
assess when it would be appropriate to raise rates,
including several indicators not related directly to
employment, such as productivity, hours worked
and household consumption. Neither central bank
ended its forward guidance programme.
The second component of forward guidance is an
active communication strategy about the targets.
The banks want to influence market, and consumer,
expectations about future monetary policy. There
is a growing literature on how central bank com-
munication affects expectations, which in turn
affect individual behaviour4. For example, if con-
sumers expect that prices will drop next year, they
might wait to make their purchases. This type of
deflationary scenario in Japan meant prices and
economic output dropped even more than if house-
holds had expected stable or increasing prices.
These central banks have several platforms via
which to announce, and to reinforce, their forward
guidance policies. Former Fed Chairman Ben
Bernanke first announced the most recent version
of forward guidance in a press conference follow-
ing a meeting of the FOMC. This is where the legis-
lature might play a role. Current Fed Chair Janet
Yellen announced the change in the US version of
forward guidance in her testimony before the US
Congress.
There is a further relevant point. The ECB is not the
only institution that sets out future expectations
on the health of the economy or the level of infla-
tion. Some recent research suggests that
increases in political contestation lead to more
precise discussions among politicians about the
economic future (Baerg, 2013), and this in turn
provides a better hook for households on which to
set their expectations. Discussion of the future
course of monetary policy in front of the European
Parliament, and the inevitable political discus-
sions that come with the testimony both within
Parliament and in the press as part of the Mone-
tary Dialogue, represent a move towards greater
contestation and might contribute to more effec-
tive forward guidance. In this case, such discus-
sions should be encouraged for reasons of
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accountability and transparency and because
those discussions might make the policy more
effective.
2.2 The role of the Monetary Dialogue if the ECB
were to decide to implement a quantitative
easing policy
Quantitative easing (QE) means that the central
bank purchases assets, which boosts the money
supply. There is a series of expected effects. QE
provides a signal to households that monetary
policy will remain expansionary in the future and
that interest rates will remain low, which is the
same function that forward guidance is meant to
provide. QE has a similar goal to forward guidance,
namely to push down long-term interest rates, but
the central bank takes immediate action through
its purchases. This action makes the asset class
more expensive, and owners of assets are then
expected to rebalance their portfolios, meaning
that they purchase other assets. To the extent that
commercial banks are the sellers of the bonds,
they have more money on their balance sheets
they can loan to customers, which may address a
credit squeeze faced by businesses5.
The US programme began in November 2008 and
is on-going. The Fed has purchased mortgage-
backed securities in addition to the purchase of
US Treasury bonds. It asserts that QE has con-
tributed directly to the economic recovery and to
lower mortgage rates. In total, it has expanded its
balance sheet almost $3 trillion since 20076. The
Fed has announced a ‘tapering’ of its programme,
and it first reduced its purchases from $85 billion
to $75 billion per month in December 2013.
The Bank of England began its QE in January 2009
at the height of the global financial crisis and it
purchased £200 billion worth of mostly medium-
and long-term government debt by January 2010.
It made further purchases in 2011 and 2012,
which took the total amount to £375 billion. It is
no longer actively buying government bonds.
The Bank of Japan introduced what it calls quanti-
tative and qualitative easing (QQE) in April 2013.
The main purpose of the policy is to maintain price
stability, which in practice means raising inflation
towards its target of two percent, and it is done by
trying to double the country’s monetary base. Like
the Fed, it purchases its government’s bonds, and
this is its main tool, with purchases of about 50
trillion yen per year as of 2013. It also buys
exchange-traded funds (1 trillion yen) and Japan
real estate investment trusts (50 billion yen)7.
Each of these programmes therefore purchases
government bonds. The ECB has announced a so-
far unused policy to do the same, namely Outright
Monetary Transactions (OMT), which  allows the
ECB to purchase essentially unlimited amounts of
government bonds of member states that are
already subject to a European Stability Mechanism
programme, as long as the member states in ques-
tion respect the conditions of the ESM programme.
The ECB contends that this policy could be neces-
sary on monetary policy grounds, namely to safe-
guard “an appropriate monetary policy
transmission and the singleness of the monetary
policy”8. Yet OMT is not strictly conceived as a
direct monetary tool meant to push down interest
rates across the euro area (Mody, 2014)9.
For the ECB, a quantitative easing programme
would probably mean the purchase of bonds of
euro-area countries. The purchase of such assets
would have distributional consequences. Govern-
ments would gain by paying less interest on their
debt, while some households would lose by earn-
ing less interest on their savings10. Any govern-
ment intervention in the economy that leads to
profits for some groups in society should be sub-
ject to parliamentary oversight, with parliament
holding the central bank directly accountable for
such decisions. This is common practice where
other central banks have initiated quantitative
easing — the Fed has to defend its QE programme
before Congress, while the UK Parliament created
a Select Committee to take evidence on the Bank
of England’s programme11. Should the ECB adopt
this policy, the Monetary Dialogue would be an
ideal platform for the European Parliament to eval-
uate any such programme under the ECB’s remit. 
2.3 Should the Monetary Dialogue evolve to take
into account the new role of the ECB as
financial supervisor?
The Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) fore-
sees the European Central Bank as the supervisor
5. A good summary appears
in Joyce et al (2011).
6. The Economist, 14 Janu-
ary 2014.
7. See the explanation on
the Bank of Japan website,
and Bank of Japan (2013).
8. European Central Bank
(2012).
9. There is an ongoing court
case against OMT that
began in the German Consti-
tutional Court and is now
pending at the EU Court of
Justice. Whether OMT con-
stitutes ‘monetary policy’ is
one of the issues in con-
tention.
10. In a recent report on the
distributional conse-
quences of quantitative
easing from 2007 to 2012,
the McKinsey Global Insti-
tute (2013) estimates that
governments collectively
saved $1.6 trillion, non-
financial corporations
saved $710 billion, while
private household savers
lost $610 billion. Our point
is not that these figures are
necessarily correct, but that
they are significant and
should be subject to parlia-
mentary review.
11. Further information on
the testimony is available at
http://www.parliament.uk/b
usiness/committees/com-
mittees-a-z/commons-
select/treasury-committee/
news/committee-to-take-
evidence-on-qe/.
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12. See Article 26(5) of Reg-
ulation 024/2013.
13. See Howarth and
Quaglia (2013) on the role
of the European Parliament
in the SSM.
14. European Central Bank
and European Parliament
(2013). For concerns about
whether this procedure will
be transparent enough
about the state of the bank-
ing system, see Gandrud
and Hallerberg (2014). 
of ‘significant’ banks in the euro area. National
supervisors will be most important for the remain-
ing banks, although the ECB will cooperate with
national authorities and can take responsibility for
any bank in the euro area if it so chooses.
A concern is that the ECB’s monetary policy objec-
tives could conflict in the future with its banking
supervision responsibilities. An increase in inter-
est rates, for example, could be useful to maintain
the ECB’s inflation target, but it also might put pres-
sure on the balance sheets of banks that have sig-
nificant levels of short-term debt. It could also lead
to an increase in non-performing loans if cus-
tomers who took out short-term loans cannot
afford higher interest rates. The central bank deci-
sion to address price stability would also affect
bank profitability and (perhaps) financial stabil-
ity. There is evidence that countries in which the
monetary authority and banking supervisor are
united in one institution have higher inflation rates
than those in which these authorities are separate
(eg Copelovitch and Singer, 2008).
Some steps have been taken to avoid this conflict.
According to the regulation that establishes the
supervisor, the ECB’s Governing Council appoints
four individuals to the Supervisory Board, all of
whom should not perform duties directly related
to monetary policy12. There are also arguments
that there are important synergies between the
two roles. Darvas and Merler (2013) suggest that
liquidity assistance that only a central bank can
provide is crucial to a banking supervisor. They
also suggest that the ECB drop co-decision on var-
ious types of financial assistance programmes
because such policies might represent a true con-
flict of interest.
Given that the decision has been taken that the
ECB will add banking supervision to its pre-
existing mandate to set monetary policy, how
could, and should, the role of the Monetary
Dialogue change to ensure democratic
accountability? We have some concerns about
the democratic accountability of the ECB as a
supervisor under banking union. The European
Parliament does have the right to approve the
Chair and Vice-Chair of the SSM Supervisory Board,
but the ECB selects the candidates13. There is an
agreement between the European Parliament and
the ECB that the Chair of the Supervisory Board will
appear twice a year before the relevant European
Parliament committee. The ECB will also submit an
annual report to Parliament on its activities as a
Supervisor, and the Chair is expected to present
the report in an open hearing. There are also
provisions for making specific hearings
confidential14. Regardless of how well the
European Parliament holds the ECB accountable
for its function as banking supervisor, one would
expect that concerns about whether decisions
taken as supervisor affect monetary policy to be
part of the remit of the Monetary Dialogue.
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